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Anglo-French Negotiations Concerning Cameroon 
during World War I, 1914-1916: Occupation, 
“Condominium” and Partition1 
 
 
Lovett Z. Elango 
 
 
Anglo-French disagreements over Cameroon during World War I and the efforts to resolve 
them both during the Allied campaigns in the territory and at the end of the war suggest 
that negotiation can occur even in wartime successfully. At the outbreak of the war 
Cameroon was a German territory like Tanganyika, South West Africa, and Togoland. The 
Anglo-French grand strategy and war aims were to seize these territories and oust the 
Germans from them. Consequently, Cameroon became the theater of an intense military 
struggle and a pawn of Anglo-French imperial rivalry fuelled by the conflicting territorial 
ambitions and claims of France and Britain. The outcome was that both countries, after 
protracted and often acrimonious negotiations over pieces of territory that were typical of 
19th-century imperialism, eventually abandoned a proposed condominium for the joint 
administration of Cameroon in favor of outright partition of the territory although 
Cameroonians were absent from the negotiations. This paper highlights the issues and 
traces the main stages in the evolving disagreement that led to this outcome. It is based on 
research conducted at the Public Record Office (PRO), now National Archives, London. I 
am grateful to the British Council for its generous bursary, which made it possible. 
 
Introduction 
 
When Britain and France embarked upon the joint conquest of the German colonies of 
Togoland and Cameroon2 at the outbreak of World War I, they seemed to have shelved, at 
least for the time being, the colonial rivalries which had often troubled their relations before 
the war. If nothing else, their relatively rapid joint conquest of Togo in August 1914 seemed 
to encourage this view. Had this wartime cooperation continued it might have enabled them 
not only to conquer but also to rule those territories jointly during and after the war. 
 Unfortunately, no sooner had the Allied operations in Cameroon begun than the 
rivalries resurfaced. The reasons for this are not hard to find. France entered the campaign 
intent on recovering the territories of Equatorial Africa, now part Cameroon, which she 
                                                 
1 This paper is part of a larger study entitled “The Anglo French Condominium in Cameroon, 1914-
1916: History of a Misunderstanding.” Parts of this larger study have been published by Navi-Group 
Publications in Cameroon, and in the International Journal of African Historical Studies 19, 4 (1985) 
under the title “The Anglo-French ‘Condominium’ in Cameroon, 1914-1916: The Myth and the 
Reality.” I am grateful to the editors of the Journal for permission to use it here in slightly rewritten 
form. 
2 Henceforth Cameroon. 
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had been forced to cede to Germany in 1911. Moreover, she had not abandoned the old 
dream of a French Empire comprising unbroken territory between Algiers and Brazzaville 
(Osuntokun, 1975, p. 650). Britain, on the other hand, was anxious to capture the port town 
of Duala and its powerful transmission station which the Germans used to monitor shipping 
and other movements in the South Atlantic. As the campaign progressed, Britain gradually 
developed territorial interests and ambitions in Cameroon. In general, she wished to 
retrieve the lost territories of the Lamido of Yola and the Shehu of Borno whose lands had 
been divided by the arbitrary map drawing of the partition era (Osuntokun, 1975, pp. 649-
650). These ambitions eventually gave birth to the strained Anglo-French relations during 
much of the 18-month campaign. Essentially, then, the war merely provided Britain and 
France a pretext for further colonial conquest and annexation. They tried to disguise this 
fact when, early in the campaign, they agreed to establish a condominium over the 
territories of Cameroon, which they had jointly conquered and occupied. This study will 
show that the projected Condominium never materialized because of the clashing territorial 
ambitions and claims of the two Allies. 
 On September 27, 1914, a party of British Marines occupied the port town of Duala, 
shortly after British battleship H.M.S. Challenger briefly bombarded it and secured its 
surrender. The Marines were the first contingent of an Anglo-French force, variously 
named the African Expeditionary Force, West African Expeditionary Force, and 
Cameroons Expeditionary Force. After surrendering Duala, the Germans retreated into the 
interior of Cameroon and established the provisional capital of their administration in 
Yaounde, where it remained until the end of the Cameroon campaigns. 
 Henceforth, until the Germans were defeated and ousted from the territory in January 
1916, Duala served a dual purpose as the headquarters of the Expeditionary Force, 
commanded by British officer Brigadier-General Charles M. Dobell and the seat of the 
Anglo-French administration of the occupied territories, also headed by Dobell. It was from 
Duala, then, that Dobell administered, in principle on behalf of the Allies, the regions of 
Cameroon conquered by the Allied troops.  
 But the adoption and proclamation of the principle of joint administration of the 
conquered territories by the two Allies were one thing, its application another. Not 
surprisingly, differences soon arose between the Allies concerning its application. This 
study attempts to reconstruct the negotiations leading first to the agreement for joint 
invasion and occupation of Cameroon and next to the eventual partition of Cameroon into 
British and French territories at the Versailles peace settlement at the end of the war. More 
specifically, it tries to show that the administrative “arrangement,”3 which has been rather 
grandiosely christened the Anglo-French Condominium by Ndam Njoya (n.d.)4 and others, 
was in fact so heavily weighted in favor of the British that it was virtually a British 
administration. 
 
Anglo-French (Re)conquest of Cameroon 
 
                                                 
3 This is the term frequently used, at least initially, by the British. 
4 Ndam Njoya, Le Cameroun Dans Les Relations Internationale, Yaounde: n.d. Also Che-Mfombong, 
“Bamenda Under British Administration, 1916-1961: From Native Administration to Local 
Government.” Masters Thesis, University of Yaounde, 1980.  
Lovett Z. Elango 111 
 
Naturally, the first concern of the Allied troops after the capture of Duala was the 
consolidation of their position. With this object in view, during October- December 1914, 
they launched combined military-naval operations to the north, to the south, to the 
southwest, and to the southeast of Duala. These operations were designed to drive out any 
pockets of German resistance, prevent their return, as well as secure lines of 
communication. Consequently, by December 1914, the Anglo-French troops commanded 
by Dobell were more or less firmly established in the Nkongsamba-Dschang-Bare district 
in the north, the Victoria district in the southwest, and the Yabassi-Edea district in the 
southeast.5 
 But these were not the only regions of Cameroon jointly or separately conquered and 
occupied by British and French troops during this initial phase of the campaign. On August 
14, 1914, before Dobell’s Expeditionary force arrived in Duala Colonel C. H. P Carter, 
Commandant of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) was granted permission to 
reconnoitre the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Three columns of Nigerian troops of the WAFF 
were deployed along the Nigeria-Cameroon border pending orders from Lagos. On August 
17, Nigerian troops of the so-called Cross River Column, led by Lieutenant Colonel C. T. 
Mair, launched an offensive from Ikom on the Nigeria-Cameroon border. After a few 
setbacks, the column resumed the offensive and bravely fought their way to Ossidinge 
(modern Mamfe), and eventually to Bamenda on October 22, 1915 (Gorges, 2004, p. 132). 
Two other Columns of Nigerian troops were deployed on the Nigeria-Cameroon border. 
With some assistance from the French, the British managed to capture Garua and Kusseri, 
and thus created a Nigerian front in the war. Persistent rumors of an Anglo-French 
Condominium began to surface. Not surprisingly, these territories became a matter of 
contentious bargaining between the Allies in talks at the end of the war. But more 
importantly, the territories made Nigeria—and its Governor-General Lugard—an 
important factor in the Anglo-French negotiations concerning the establishment of the 
condominium, its possible extension beyond Duala and contiguous territories, and the 
provisional and ultimate partition of the conquered territories of Cameroon.  
 The French, on their own part, had initiated hostilities which opened a southeast front 
of the campaign. On August 6, 1914 French troops form Brazzaville, capital of Moyen 
Congo, captured two posts just inside the northeastern Cameroon border (Farwell, 1987, p. 
36). This was only the first operation by two columns commanded by General Joseph 
Aymerich, Commander of French Equatorial African troops. It was also the first strike in 
the reconquest of the territory which France had ceded to Germany in 1911. One column, 
under Colonel Hutin advanced from Bongo up the Sanga River; the second, under Colonel 
Marrison, struck westward from Singa up the Lobaye River and finally reached a line 
Carnot-Nola-Ouesso on the Sanga River in October 1914. Here the column was reinforced 
by a Belgian contingent from Congo and continued its westward march.  
 By Christmas 1914 these troops had captured Betare and Molundu, two principal 
towns of the southeast. By March 1915 they were within striking distance of Doume and 
                                                 
5 See Dobell to War Office (WO). March 1. 1916. CQ 649110.PRO London. (All documents in the 
CO series are found in the PRO) 
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Lomie, the other principal towns of the southeast.6 Other French troops led by Colonel 
Miquelard engaged the Germans in the southwest and expelled them from German Muni 
while a column led by Colonel Le Meilleur advanced northwards parallel with the eastern 
frontier of Spanish Guinea.  
 The end result of these Franco-Belgian operations under the overall command of 
General Aymerich was the complete reconquest of the territories ceded to Germany in 
1911. But the reconquest was unaided by any Allied forces commanded by General Dobell. 
As far as the French were concerned, therefore, the future of these territories was absolutely 
beyond any negotiation.  
 Thus, by the end of war, there were three widely separated groups of Cameroon 
territories jointly or separately conquered and held by the Allies. The first was what may 
be conveniently called the core territories in the Duala area where Dobell was in direct 
control on behalf of the Allies. This area had been chosen by the Offensive Sub-Committee 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence as the first Allied objective because, together with 
Victoria and Buea and their surrounding plantations, Duala represented the administrative 
and commercial heartland of Cameroon. Its conquest, therefore, would cripple German 
administration and provide a base for further conquests (Henderson, 1962, p. 99). 
 The second area was Northern Cameroon where Dobell was not in direct command. 
Cunliffe, a British officer was in command there although there was some question as to 
whether a French or British officer should be the commander (Osuntokun, 1979, pp. 185-
186). The third was Southeast Cameroon, which had been conquered by the Franco-
Belgian troops commanded by Aymerich. The withdrawal of German administration from 
these regions inevitably imposed on the Allies the task of filling the vacuum by organizing 
a substitute administration even while they pursued their principal military objective of 
conquering the whole of Cameroon. In the face of repeated German attempts to retake some 
of these captured areas, especially in the Duala district, the need for some form of 
administration, as part of the effort at consolidation, was particularly urgent. Otherwise, 
the Allied hold on these territories would be precarious at best.  
 This is the immediate background against which the Allies began discussing plans for 
the joint administration which has been called the Anglo-French Condominium. As will 
become clear subsequently, this was a misnomer.  
 
The Debate over Condominium 
 
According to Madiba-Essiben, it was the French who first proposed the establishment of a 
Condominium in Cameroon (Madiba-Essiben, 1981, p. 44). The proposal seemed to have 
followed logically from the decision by Britain and France to invade and conquer the 
territory jointly as they had conquered Togoland in August 1914. The first discussions 
between the two governments on this matter seem to have taken place sometime early in 
August 1914, apparently soon after the capture of Duala. Those talks were held between 
the British Ambassador to Paris, Sir Francis Bertie, and the French government, and it is 
possibly then that the subsequently troublesome word “condominium” was first used. The 
                                                 
6 See Rapport du General Aymerich, Commandant Superieur des Troupes de Groupe de l’A.E.F. sur 
les operations engages contre le Cameroun Allemand, CO 649/5. Also, Aymerich, La Conquete du 
Cameroun (Paris: Payot, 1933).  
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talks culminated in a preliminary agreement which Bertie communicated to the Foreign 
Office (FO) in a despatch dated December 15, 1915.  
 The precise substance of these talks can be gathered from the instructions which the 
F.O. sent to Bertie by telegram on January 14, 1915. The Ambassador was instructed to 
inform the French government that, subject to its concurrence, the British Government 
“accepted the proposal for a Condominium in Cameroon” (include citation here). The 
telegram went on,  
 
 General Dobell should assume Government with full powers in all matters military 
and civil, such full powers being exercised with due regard to the joint nature of the 
administration under his control.  
 In order to ensure continuity of system and to avoid dislocation of staff work, the next 
senior British military officer should be designated as temporary successor to Dobell, in 
case of the latter’s death or disability, pending decision by two Governments as to a 
permanent successor.  
 The two Governments will bear the expenses of maintaining their respective troops. 
If expenses of administration exceed revenues or vice versa, deficit or surplus to be 
eventually either apportioned between two Governments in proportion to territory annexed 
or divided equally 
 Territory on Nigerian boundary and on boundaries of French colonies now occupied 
by troops under General Dobell’s command to continue to be administered by British and 
French colonial authorities until circumstances permit of handing them over to 
Condominium administration. (FO to Bertie, Jan 14, 1915, CO 649/3) 
 
 The telegram ended by expressing the hope that if the French government concurred 
in these “suggestions” it would instruct French colonial authorities to give Dobell “all 
possible assistance in men and material” to enable him to organize an administration (FO 
to Bertie, CO 649/3).  
 On February 6, 1915, the French ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, 
communicated the French reply to the British “suggestions” to the FO (Cambon to FO, 
February 3, 1915, CO 649/3). The French agreed to the British “suggestions” on all but 
one fundamental point. In their view, the attribution of all powers in military and civil 
matters to Dobell did not “conform exactly to the Condominium principle” (Cambon to 
FO). The principle would, on the contrary, be respected if the officer charged with the 
provisional administration were assisted by a civil servant of the other Allied power. The 
same combination, it added, would obtain if Dobell’s successor were British. If, however, 
he were French a British civil administrator would be designated as his assistant (Cambon 
to FO, February 3, 1915, CO 649/3). This naturally raised the question as to the nationality 
of Dobell’s successor in case of the latter’s death or departure. On this issue, where the 
British proposed that he be temporarily succeeded by the next senior British officer 
pending the appointment of a permanent successor by the two Governments, the French 
merely proposed that he be replaced by “the most senior military officer” (Cambon to FO, 
February 3, 1915, CO 649/3). In the ensuing weeks, British and French governments 
continued to debate the condominium proposal. Differences of opinion emerged between 
their respective colonial and foreign offices, and between these government departments 
and their “men on the ground” in Cameroon and other parts of West Africa. The debates 
are contained in official correspondences, minutes, and draft memoranda. 
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 What emerges from these correspondences and the various reservations expressed was 
a substantial disagreement and misunderstanding between the British and the French on 
two fundamental and inextricably linked issues revolving around the nature and territorial 
extent of the proposed condominium administration. The first issue can be conveniently 
termed the authority issue, the second the territorial issue. The authority issue concerned 
the competence of the commanding officer and had two aspects, namely, whether he should 
share his power with a civil administrator and who was to be his potential successor.  
 The territorial issue concerned whether or not the condominium arrangement should 
be extended to the regions of Cameroon jointly and separately conquered and occupied by 
the Allied troops or, alternately, what was to be the basis of eventual partition of those 
territories between the Allies. The British, pleading military necessity, envisaged the 
extension of the arrangement to the regions conquered as the campaign progressed. In 
principle, the French were not averse to this. But they considered its extension to territories 
which their troops had conquered unaided, including Southeastern Cameroon, out of the 
question. As far as they were concerned, these were territories of which they had been 
unjustly deprived by the Franco-German Convention in 1911, but which they had now 
retrieved with their unaided arms. They would therefore limit the extension of the 
administration and the partition especially to the core areas around Duala jointly conquered 
and occupied by the French and British troops.  
 But there was a new and significant element in the French position on the territorial 
issue. In the beginning they seem to have envisaged a settlement involving Cameroon 
alone, but as we have seen, by August, in typical 19th century fashion they saw partition 
of Cameroon as only part of a broader settlement at the end of the war in Europe and Africa, 
which would involve all German colonies. Such a settlement, again in a manner 
characteristic of the 19th century, was to keep in view the interests of all parties and the 
possibility of tidying up untidy prewar colonial frontiers.  
 Notwithstanding this impasse Dobell, aware only that there had been an Anglo-French 
agreement to establish “some sort of Condominium,” but unaware of the details of this 
arrangement which were still being worked out with difficulty by the two Governments, 
continued to run things as he had apparently done since the capture of Duala. His only 
authority is this regard was the rather broad understanding which the two governments had 
reached to jointly invade Cameroon, for which task he, as commanding officer, had been 
granted full powers in “matters civil and military,” but only because of “his peculiar fitness 
for the job” (Osuntokun, 1979, p. 183).The administration which he formed–and which the 
British government wanted preserved–therefore had few of the features which the French, 
as a matter of principle, subsequently wished to see included in it. It consisted of 
“departments” which were run mainly by British officials. The officers who ran these 
services, and others whom Dobell wished from time to time to associate with this work, 
acted under his direct orders.  
 Not surprisingly, therefore, the French informed the British of their intention to 
appoint French officers, also known as French Delegation, to serve on the condominium 
government. As early as July 29, 1915, the French minister for the colonies had written to 
Supplies Officer Dunand-Henry (sous intendant) to the French forces in Cameroon, 
naming him head of the French Delegation (Delcassé to Dunand-Henry, August 29, 1915. 
CO 649 4), which was to comprise two other officials, Damiens and Decharte, both third 
class colonial administrators. Damiens was still in Brazzaville at the time of his 
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appointment and Decharte was due to sail for Duala on September 31, 1915 (Bertie to FO, 
August 7, 1915, CO 649/3). These men were to be preceded to Duala by a certain Jaillard, 
who was going to Duala as Postmaster (Comis des postes) and was to resume duty there 
on September 12 (Bertie to FO, September 3, 1915, CO 649/3).  
 The appointment of these men gave the first clear indication of the French 
determination to break the impasse between Britain and France and also clearly revealed 
the scale of the changes which the French envisaged in the existing administrative system. 
The letter of appointment defined both the structure of the administration and the rights 
and duties of these men in it.  
 Regarding the structure, it was to consist of “Commissions of Civil Officers.” These 
commissions were to function within the framework of political, administrative, and 
financial division so that neither of the “co-associated Governments” sustained vis-à-vis 
the other “a moral or material prejudice.” Concerning the financial system, all net revenues 
from customs, railway accounts, and plantation management were to be paid into a 
common treasury so that a subsequent division could be made on an agreed basis, and all 
funds were to be equitably used for French and British expenditures (Delcassé to Dunand-
Henry, August 29, 1915. CO 649 4).  
 To ensure strict adherence to these principles, Dunand Henry’ principal duty was to 
consist in giving an opinion on all measures discussed in the commissions of which he was 
a member, and he and his colleagues were to brief the minister on their point of view on 
these matters but were otherwise to remain within strict limits of subordination to Dobell. 
On the other hand, Dunand-Henry was to continue personally to ensure the management 
of the affairs of the French Columns in Cameroon (Delcassé to Dunand-Henry, August 29, 
1915. CO 649 4). 
 If the French had hoped to break the impasse between the two governments with the 
appointment of the delegation, they were sadly mistaken. Contrary to their expectations, 
the appointment of the delegation only served to harden the British attitude. To a large 
extent, this hardening of the British position was reinforced by Dobell’s strenuous 
objections to the new French move. This was understandable, for as we have seen above, 
his position was, from the British point of view, a pivotal one. Moreover, Dobell learned 
of the impending appointment of French Delegation after the arrival in Douala of Jaillard, 
the “Postmaster.” Dobell objected to this appointment and the manner in which it was 
made. He also objected to the arrangement on financial, organizational, and territorial 
grounds—as far as he was concerned, the existing postal system was functioning quite 
well. The British Colonial Office (CO) agreed with him, but the FO reacted differently. 
 For reasons which are far from being clear, the first British reaction to the French 
initiative focused specifically on Jaillard’s appointment. This was probably because 
Jaillard’s appointment to a specific post most directly and immediately challenged Dobell’s 
system, while the appointment of the delegation was a matter of principle which still left 
some room for maneuver and negotiation. At any rate, on September 23, 1915, Bertie 
informed Delcassé that the British government objected to “the despatch of French officials 
to Duala, including a Monsieur Jaillard as Postmaster . . . without previous consultation 
with . . . Dobell and without his administrative requirements having been ascertained” (to 
Dobell, October 18, 1915, CO 649/4) Clearly, the appointment of Jaillard was all the more 
objectionable because in the meantime, Dobell had let it be known that the postal services 
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already established were working satisfactorily (FO to Bertie, December 20, 1915, CO 
649/4). 
 The French reply to this protest was surprisingly tame, in view of the fact that the 
appointments were consistent with their strong belief in the principle of equal 
representation in the administration. In a note to Bertie dated October 3, 1915, Delcassé 
claimed that the French had sent Jaillard not to open a post office but to serve in the one 
already established by the Allied Forces, especially in the section which handled postal 
money orders (mandats poste) addressed to French troops in Cameroon. He then assured 
the British government that no French civil servants would in future be sent to Cameroon 
by the colonial administration of the area occupied by the Allied Forces “without General 
Dobell being informed before hand and without the necessary clarification being provided” 
(FO to Bertie, December 21, 1915, CO 649/4). 
 These assurances were, in fact, more than assurances. They were, above all, huge 
concessions to the British on a matter of principle. But from the CO point of view, however, 
they were too evasive, and Strachey and his colleagues at the CO were quite rightly 
dissatisfied with them. What the French in fact promised was that they would not in future 
appoint any civilian administrator without informing Dobell before hand. But they still 
reserved the right, as formally equal partners, to make such appointments. Conversely, 
what the British had wanted them to promise was that they would not make any 
appointments without previously consulting Dobell and ascertaining his needs. This was a 
nuance, but it was a nuance with significant implications which were not lost on Strachey 
and his colleagues. Quite clearly, this was unacceptable because it could only lead to 
administrative paralysis. 
 Unfortunately, from the intelligence reaching the French government, it emerged that 
the representative of the two Allies had placed British civil servants at the head of all 
services of the new Cameroon administration while asking for the services of only a small 
proportion, and for subordinate tasks, of French civil servants. This situation, well known 
in French colonial circles, was causing disquiet there, and informed public opinion could 
not understand why French civil servants did not play a role in the Cameroon 
administration commensurate with the role which French troops were playing in the 
conquest of the colony. For these reasons, the minister expressed the hope that the British 
government would remind Dobell that “in exercising authority as representative of the two 
Allies he must willingly accept, indeed equally solicit, for the civil administration of 
Cameroon, French collaboration as well as British” (FO to Bertie, December 21, 1915, CO 
649/4). 
 The French response again revealed the differences in attitude between the British FO 
and CO, the former seeming more conciliatory and the latter less so. In what sounded like 
a mild rebuke of Dobell and presumably his bosses at the CO, Langley, a FO official, 
regretted that “this whole question has given rise to . . . an amount of friction between the 
two Governments which is most undesirable between two Allies in the present 
circumstances” (Langley to CO, December 16, 1915, CO 649/4). He therefore expressed 
the hope that Dobell would “do his utmost to allay the colonial jealousies which underlie 
the present situation” (Langley to CO, December 16, 1915, CO 649/4) Quite clearly, 
Langley also hoped that Dobell’s bosses at the CO would give their man in Duala better 
instructions about how to placate the French. By the first quarter of 1915, the condominium 
idea seemed to have lost steam. Having disagreed on how the condominium would be 
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administered, British and French governments turned attention to what they did best: 
partition. 
 
Anglo-French Partition 
 
It was not Dobell—or the British for that matter—that first raised this delicate matter. 
Rather, it was the French who first explicitly raised it in a Memorandum dated March 19, 
1915,7 which the French Military Attaché in London addressed to the War Office (WO). 
The Memorandum was apparently prompted by a despatch which the French Ministry for 
the Colonies addressed to the French embassy in London. That despatch was in turn based 
on a report by General Pineu, Commander of French West African forces, whose 
headquarters were at Dakar. What this suggests, therefore, is that the matter had been 
widely discussed in both French colonial and metropolitan official circles.  
 Essentially, the memorandum made two points. First, it claimed that the French had 
been assigned the greater share of the fighting necessary to achieve victory in Cameroon. 
This was so, the memorandum claimed, because two-thirds of the German forces in 
Cameroon were “opposed to our forces operating in the south, east and north of . . . 
Cameroon.” Against these forces, the French claimed to have deployed 7,500 men whilst 
the British had so far fielded only 4,800. In addition, the front allotted to the French was 
said to be “by far the more difficult one” on account of the great swamps in its river valleys, 
and the almost impenetrable forest in the West (See Memorandum, 649/4). This being so, 
the memorandum concluded, the initial agreement which provided for the deployment of 
equal forces in the joint effort “is not fulfilled, and France is left to conduct the more 
difficult and more arduous operations.8  
 Secondly, in what was clearly a veiled criticism of Dobell’s strategy, the memorandum 
claimed that French Columns were in the very heart of Cameroon, 500 kilometers from 
their starting points, whilst the Expeditionary Force led by Dobell “is only some hundred 
kilometres from the base . . . in Duala” (citation here). The French government therefore 
felt that it would be dangerous to allow its Columns to advance further, while Dobell 
confined himself to occupying Duala and the districts bordering Nigeria. Concluding, the 
memorandum insisted that, 
 
It is all the more necessary to throw light upon the efforts made by the French troops since, 
in the reports which he sends in and which are kindly communicated to us by Sir Francis 
Bertie . . . Dobell makes no mention of the progress of the French Columns which are not 
acting under his immediate orders, and speaks very little of the assistance given him by the 
French forces operating with him. (WO to French Military Attaché, April 1915, 
Memorandum, CO 649/4)  
 
 Harcourt agreed that the French Memorandum was “not at all pleasant.” He was not 
alone in holding this view. Harding for his part described it as a “very offensive 
memorandum” and speculated that it may have been written by the French Colonial Office 
                                                 
7 See “Memorandum On the Operations In Cameroon.” Translation. CO 469/4. Hereafter 
Memorandum. 
8 See Memorandum. CO 649/4.  
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“behind the back of the French F.O.” in order “to edge their men in and get effective hold 
of the country” (Minute by Harding, September 16, 1915 CO 649/5).  
 As for the Admiralty, its position with regard to the Memorandum and the issues which 
it raised was the subject of a letter dated May 14, 1915, addressed to the CO (Nicholson to 
CO, May 14, 1915, CO 649/1). While deploring the raising of this question because of the 
acrimony it could provoke, the Admiralty nevertheless conceded two points. First, it 
admitted that the French contention was justified, especially since the advance of the 
French forces had been through marshy lands and was attended by “great difficulties.” 
Second, it conceded the numerical superiority of French native troops, although it argued 
that this superiority was perhaps somewhat offset by the superiority of British white troops. 
But the core of the Admiralty’s response was again the naval factor argument. In this 
connection, it agreed with the CO and Dobell that an important aspect of the question had 
been ignored, namely, the capture of the coastline and especially Duala and the adjacent 
districts of Buea, Edea, and Bare (Nicholson to CO, May 14, 1915, CO 649/1). 
 Lugard’s position did not differ much from that of the CO, the Admiralty, and Dobell. 
In general, he argued that the British had played the decisive and less self-seeking role in 
the campaign. In his opinion, the French conquests in the east and their operations in the 
north had been largely made possible by the fact that the British had devoted themselves 
to the “main object” of engaging the German forces. In sum, the arguments which each 
government adduced in support of its case indicate that they both felt that their respective 
contributions to the conquest of Cameroon had been underestimated or ignored by the other 
Ally.  
 This was how matters stood on the diplomatic front when the Allies resumed their 
long-delayed offensive following the long, prohibitive rainy season in Cameroon. On 
January 1, 1916, British troops commanded by Colonel Gorges entered Yaounde, the 
Germans having been forced to flee to Spanish territory, 120 miles to the south, by the 
Allied advance. On January 4, Gorges was joined in Yaounde by Colonel Cunliffe, another 
British Officer, and General Aymerich. For all practical purposes, the war in Cameroon 
was over. True, German resistance in Cameroon continued in far-off Mora until February 
18 when the town capitulated, but the main issue of the war in Cameroon had by then been 
largely settled by the fall of Yaounde.  
 The capture of Yaounde by the Allies opened a new, decisive phase in the Anglo-
French negotiations concerning the administration and partition of Cameroon. On January 
11, 10 days after Gorges and his Column entered Yaounde, the FO wrote to the CO 
suggesting that in view of the capture of the capital and the probability that the whole of 
Cameroon would soon be in Allied hands, it would serve no useful purpose to continue the 
discussions with the French government concerning the administration of Duala and the 
form of administration which was presumably soon to be replaced by a new system (de 
Bunsen to CO, February 11, 1916, CO 649/9). This was so, the FO added, “in view of the 
discussions which were soon to commence on the form which administration of the whole 
territory was to take until the end of the war” (The Bunsen to CO, February 11, 1916, CO 
649/9).  
 In a minute dated January 13, Strachey sounded the first note of diplomatic caution 
with regard to the impending discussions. He suggested that the British make no further 
proposals but let the French “show their hand” by making a counterproposal. The second 
comment by a CO official in this connection was even more trenchant: it suggested that 
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the British at once ask the French for a counterproposal and that in doing so the CO should 
indicate that no condominium would work. He further suggested that Strachey be sent to 
Paris to discuss the matter with Bertie and the French government in the event that the 
anticipated French counterproposal were inadmissible.  
 Finally, he urged that the CO press the WO to suggest to Dobell that in evacuating 
Yaounde and concentrating his troops, “he might so arrange that Duala and neighbourhood 
is effectively occupied by British troops” (de Bunsen to CO, February 11, 1916, CO 649/9). 
 Given the deep and widespread French suspicion of British motives which Madiba-
Essiben has so well documented (Madiba, Essiben, 1981, pp. 41-42), it is more than likely 
that the French understood the implications of Dobell’s attempt to concentrate his troops 
at Duala and that they wanted to forestall it. In February 1916, the French added another 
element of acrimony to the negotiations. In a letter to Bertie, they informed him that in 
view of the Allied offensive and the impending termination of Dobell’s powers, they were 
proposing to instruct Aymerich to “cooperate with the competent British authority on an 
equal footing” in administering the zone of Cameroon jointly conquered by the 
Expeditionary Force commanded by Dobell (citation). To this end, Aymerich would be 
instructed to proceed to Duala on March 1 accompanied by some civilian officials (Bertie 
to FO, February 13, 1916, CO 649/9). 
 At the CO, Harding’s reaction to this latest French move was characteristically 
forthright. He proposed to reply to the French that,  
 
the Secretary of State entertains the strongest objections to the French proposal and 
considers that the Government should be informed that H.M. Government cannot accept it 
and must ask that any instructions which may have been sent to . . . Aymerich to carry it 
out may be at once cancelled . . . and that for the French to have given such instructions 
can only be regarded as an attempt to prejudge the question of the form of administration. 
(Harding to CO). 
 
 With this parting shot, the CO and its administrators faded into the background and 
the FO and its diplomats formally took over. With regard to the Cameroon question at least, 
the FO were now in a better position to view and treat the matter in a wider “globalist” 
diplomatic context. Among other things, this globalist approach permitted the FO to 
achieve the long-standing goal of conceding West African territory to other powers in order 
to secure East African territory, which was considered more vital to British interests 
(Robinson, Gallagher, & Denny, 1916, p. 191). So far as Cameroon was concerned, the FO 
were now free to take a more conciliatory approach toward France than the one which, as 
we have seen above, the more unyielding CO had until then forced them to adopt.  
 In the light of the foregoing, Fage’s description of the Allied invasion of Cameroon as 
“the last fling of the old imperialism in Africa” is particularly apt (Fage, 1978, p. 412). 
This is certainly so with regard to the Anglo-French negotiations leading to the partition of 
Cameroon. Those negotiations can be divided into a preliminary and a final phase. The 
preliminary negotiations opened in London in January 1916. Earl Grey, the foreign 
secretary, represented Britain while Cambon represented France. To begin with, Cambon 
told Grey that the French “colonial party were excited over Cameroons” He then went on 
to accuse Britain of not always being sincere with France in other areas, citing as an 
example the fact that Britain had excluded France from the campaign against German East 
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Africa even though France had assembled a large force in Madagascar for that purpose 
(Osuntokun, 1979, p. 229). Britain, he said, seemed to be suffering from a “land hunger 
disease and while she had been collecting the spoils of war all over the world, France had 
been bleeding to death on the Western Front (Osuntokun, 1979, p. 229). He therefore 
demanded that Britain hand over all of Duala to France since that was the only possible 
port for French Equatorial Africa whereas Britain had several outlets in Nigeria. He then 
assured Grey that if Britain gave up Duala France would agree to the incorporation of 
Dikwa into Bornu and drop her demands for a share of German East Africa (Osuntokun, 
1979, p. 229). 
 The British War Cabinet then took up the matter and decided that since the Union of 
South Africa was already in possession of German South West Africa, Britain would agree 
to the French demands with as little reservation as possible (Osuntokun, 1979, p. 229). The 
negotiations thus ended on March 6, 1916 with the adoption of the Picot Line as the 
provisional boundary between the British and French spheres of Cameroon (Osuntokun, 
1979, p. 229).  
 On March 6, 1919, negotiations on the final partition of Cameroon opened in London. 
Britain was represented by Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, while France was 
represented by M. Henri Simon, the French Colonial Secretary (Osuntokun, 1979, p. 283). 
M. Simon’s opening statements clearly reveal that in the mind of the French the settlement 
of the Cameroon problem was closely linked with that of Togoland and, indeed, with the 
problem of all former German colonies. Stating France’s desiderata Simon told Milner that 
France would be accommodating with regard to Cameroon since, in any case, she had nine-
tenths of the territory. With regard to Togoland, however, he said he could not be as 
forthcoming (Osuntokun, 1979, p. 283). He added that France desired the acceptance of 
the provisional partition of 1916, but insisted that she still wanted Britain to cede to her a 
piece of territory near Dschang which would be needed in the future extension to Garoua 
of the railway running northwards to Bare. According to Simon, Dschang would be on this 
route (Osuntokun, 1979, p. 283). For their part, the British desired the readjustment of the 
boundary in the extreme south in order to permit the frontier to coincide with the mouth of 
the Mungo River, and then to run from there across Bimbia flats (Osuntokun, 1979, p. 283). 
They pointed out that since the Picot Line had been hastily drawn it would be necessary to 
make several adjustments for which task a boundary commission would be necessary 
(Osuntokun, 1979, p. 283). Experts on both sides were therefore set to work to determine 
in detail where the boundary would be.  
 Turning to substantive matters, the British said that they wanted all of German Bornu, 
a strip of which had been left in the French sphere by the Picot Line, together with the 
Mandara Emirate. They also desired those parts of the Emirates of Kontscha, Lere, and 
Dodo, which the line had cut off from the rest of those districts and left in the French 
sphere. In exchange for these areas they declared themselves willing to concede to France 
the whole Emirate of Banyo, a portion of which had been assigned to Britain (Osuntokun, 
1979, p. 283). 
 The French, on the other hand, agreed that the whole of German Bornu (Dikwa) should 
go to Britain, but rejected the British demand for Mandara Emirate, claiming that the road 
from the south to Mora passed through the Mandara Emirate cutting it into two parts. They 
would concede only that third of the Emirate west of the road which, in its southern section, 
cut through Meiha and Holma, leaving out pieces of Zumu and Malau to Britain which had 
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been provisionally united to Yola in 1916. They also flatly turned down the British demand 
for the former Adamawa possessions of the Lamido of Yola. In the south, after much 
persuasion, they gave Britain the Mungo River, which formed a most valuable means of 
transport between the coast and the plantations in the hinterland of the British sphere. 
Finally, they also secured most of Kontscha Emirate and Dschang district (Osuntokun, 
1979, p. 283).  
 These negotiations ended formally on July 10, 1919 when Milner and Simon signed 
the so-called Milner-Simon Declaration which recommended the adoption of the boundary 
worked out by the experts of the two colonial offices (Osuntokun, 1979, p. 283). Despite 
the work of the experts, and despite the mutual concessions indicated above, the results of 
the final partition and boundary had been very largely foreshadowed by the provisional 
partition and boundary of 1916. The settlement was therefore wholly at variance with the 
contribution which each of the two Allies had made to the conquest of Cameroon.  
 That this was so is not surprising. As early as January 12, Strachey, who had played a 
major role in these negotiations on behalf of the British Colonial Office, showed the British 
hand when he said that the territory which the CO had asked for by map was intentionally 
designed “to give us more than we really wanted - to leave us something to bargain with” 
(Memorandum by Strachey, January 12, 1916, CO 649/11). In similar vein, he urged the 
British government not to undertake the temporary administration of a territory “largely in 
excess of what we want to hold,” because of the immediate difficulty of finding 
administrative staff to administer the territory (Memorandum by Strachey, January 12, 
1916, CO 649/11). In other words, then, the British had wanted only a bargaining chip 
which, as it turned out eventually, was one that was sufficient to improve Nigeria’s 
strategic position as well as to enable Britain to bargain for all former German colonies in 
southern Africa (Madiba-Essiben, 1981, p. 52). 
 It is therefore scarcely surprising that on March 1, 1916, the CO had instructed the 
Governor-General of Nigeria by telegram to inform Dobell that,  
 
owing to considerations of general policy affecting our relations with the French which 
have no connection with the respective shares that have been taken by the two nations in 
the conquest of the Cameroons, and after consideration of the whole subject by the War 
Committee, His Majesty’s Government have felt obliged to accede to the desire of the 
French Government that with the exception of the portions mentioned below the whole of 
the Cameroons should be administered by the French during the remainder of the war. (CO, 
personal communication, March 1, 1916)  
 
 In the section of these instructions which defined the proposed British sphere, 
particular mention was made of the status of Duala: during the rest of the war British naval 
and military forces were to be allowed to use the port of Duala, and the town of Duala itself 
was not to be ceded to a third power before the final peace settlement until the British 
government had had a chance of first refusal (CO to Governor General of Nigeria, March 
1, 1916. Telegramme. Paraphrase. CO 649/9). The latter provision indicates that the same 
strategic considerations which had dictated the British invasion and occupation of Duala 
in the first place now dictated the need for continued British access to that port. It was 
consistent with the view of Henry Jackson, the First Sea Lord, that a naval base could be 
set up at Duala from which West Africa and the South Atlantic could be dominated and 
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that this gave the port a strategic importance “comparable only with that of Kiel Canal” 
(Rothwell, 1971, p. 73). 
 The territorial issue had thus been resolved in the favor of France not on the basis of 
any formula which took into account the relative contribution of each ally to the conquest 
of Cameroon, or the financing of the campaign, but through the wisdom and imperatives 
of compensatory diplomacy. And part of that wisdom seems to have been the British desire 
to raise France’s morale (Rothwell, 1971, p. 11). Although negotiations bearing on further 
boundary adjustments lingered until 1922 when the Mandates were formally confirmed by 
the League of Nations, the main issue had been resolved by then. This resolution of the 
territorial issue necessarily entailed the resolution of the administrative problem and the 
authority question which it raised. Indeed, from the British point of view the authority 
question became a non-issue once the territorial problem was resolved, and as in the case 
of the territorial issue, the British attitude had been decisive if only because Britain was 
willing to concede much in Cameroon in order to gain more elsewhere.  
 On March 17, 1916, therefore, Dobell had issued a Proclamation dividing the 
Cameroon territories occupied by the Expeditionary Force and administered by him into 
British and French spheres. On March 14, three days before the Proclamation, the CO had 
also instructed the Governor General of Nigeria by telegram to make necessary 
arrangements for the administration of the British sphere of the former German colony, 
and for the garrisons required to occupy it. In doing so, the instructions emphasized, he 
was to consult Dobell, especially with regard to the southern districts as defined by the 
Picot Line. Because of his intimate knowledge of these matters, Dobell was to settle all 
outstanding problems before leaving Cameroon. Other matters which he considered it 
capable of handling were to be left to the Nigerian government with the fullest information 
on such matters. On the other hand, the Nigerian government was to assume the financial 
responsibility of administering the British sphere of the former “Dobell area” as from the 
date when Nigerian civil officers took over (CO to Governor General of Nigeria, March 
14, 1916. Telegramme. Paraphrase. Copy. CO 649/11). 
 This arrangement was ratified by a Royal Commission, dated March 23, 1916, 
appointing the Governor General of Nigeria the Chief Administrator of the British sphere.9 
These dispositions represented a clean break with the previous (Dobell) system, despite the 
as yet provisional nature of the partition. There was no mention of a condominium or of 
collaboration with the French in these arrangements. The French reaction to these 
arrangements is further evidence in support of Madiba-Essiben’s assertion that they were 
the poorer of the two Allies (Madiba-Essiben, 1981). It is also further proof of the extent 
to which the previous system had, in fact, been a British system and why the term 
“condominium” used to describe it is misleading.  
 On March 19, five days after the Governor General of Nigeria was instructed to assume 
the administration of the British sphere, and two days after Dobell issued his proclamation, 
Dobell informed the CO that Aymerich had been “strongly urged” by the French 
government to reach an agreement with him whereby certain British public works staff 
would be left behind to serve with the French administration in Cameroon until they could 
be relieved by French personnel from Europe. The local French administration, he added, 
had indicated its willingness to bear the cost of the officers’ salaries from April 1, 1916. 
                                                 
9 See CO 649/12.  
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Characteristically, Strachey urged the CO not to agree to a “perfectly indefinite” retention 
of British officers in Cameroon. Rather, he proposed that the CO fix a time limit, and he 
suggested that the limit be two months from April 1 (Dobell to CO, March 19.1916. 
Telegramme. Immediate. Confidential. Co 649/5). To the very end, then, the French, 
despite their fulminations against the Dobell administration and their repeated claims to 
equal representation in it, showed that they were unable to provide for their own basic 
administrative needs in Cameroon from their slender personnel resources without some 
British assistance.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As Osuntokun has pointed out, Britain and France jointly occupied German Cameroon in 
1916 with a view to using it as a bargaining chip in the worldwide negotiations that were 
expected to follow the end of hostilities in Europe (Osuntokun, 1978, p. 257). This study 
has shown that the entente between the Allies on the basis of which they invaded the 
territory broke down early in the Cameroon campaign and that the ensuing rivalries, which 
plagued the Allied war effort to the very end of the campaign, reflected their fundamentally 
conflicting territorial claims and ambitions and did not differ essentially from their rivalries 
and conflicts in the period before the war. Because these claims and ambitions were so 
central in the thinking and calculations of the two nations, the question of any form of joint 
administration had been virtually abandoned by the time Britain and France opened 
negotiations to adjust their conflicting claims. The principle of condominium, which seems 
to have been adopted mainly to redeem imperialism of some of its worst features and to 
deflect the criticisms of anti-imperialists, was thus sacrificed to the territorial ambitions of 
the Allies.  
 Not surprisingly, the negotiations which followed the end of the war were devoted 
entirely to reconciling the conflicting British and French claims. These negotiations 
therefore did not differ essentially from other negotiations concerning the distribution of 
African territories among European powers during the period of the Scramble for Africa. 
Indeed, the behavior of the Allies in Cameroon between 1914 and 1916 bore all the marks 
of a mini- scramble. Thus, for example, during their final drive to Yaounde the disposition 
of their respective forces was at least partly dictated by the desire of each Ally to stake out 
important enclaves, even though they had previously agreed in principle on closer 
cooperation between their troops during this final, climactic operation. In view of this 
preoccupation with potential territorial claims, everything else became, at best, an 
afterthought and even the mandate formula which was eventually applied to Cameroon 
was, in Osuntokun’s words, a “simple moralisation of outright annexation”  
 Consequently, the partition of Cameroon which was the main result of the negotiations 
paid scant attention to African interests. Little wonder that it was arbitrary in the extreme. 
For one thing, in seeking to placate each party it imposed a new international boundary 
which divided the peoples and communities of Cameroon in ways which disrupted their 
ancient political, economic, and cultural ties and usages. As in Togoland, the new colonial 
administrations—one British, the other French—which were the practical expressions of 
the mandate formula created a new political, economic, and cultural ethos which in each 
case was at variance with precolonial experience.  
124 Journal of Global Initiatives 
 
 As in Togo, where the division of the Ewe between British and French Togoland later 
became the basis of Pan-Ewe nationalism (Decalo, 1976, p. 5), these matters provided some 
of the focal issues which fuelled Cameroon nationalism scarcely 40 years later. Even today, 
many years after independence, the political, economic, and cultural legacies of partition 
continue to pose some of the most formidable obstacles to nation building in Cameroon. 
The effort to create a genuinely bilingual ethos and the effort to bridge the gap in the 
differential economic development of the former British and French mandates, not to 
mention the problems arising from the different styles of thought and action of 
Anglophones and Francophones, are only the most glaring and pressing of these problems. 
And, as recent events have shown, even more pressing has been the frontier problem which 
the partition created for Cameroon and her Nigerian neighbor. Only the Greentree Accord 
of 2009 brokered by the international community under the auspices of the UN after many 
bloody border clashes and World Court litigation finally liquidated this lingering irritant of 
the legacy of the Great War. 
 
References 
 
Primary Sources: Files from the National Archives, London 
CO 649/1 
CO 649/13 
CO 649/5 
CO 649/8 
CO 649/9 
CO 649/11 
Aymerich, J. (1933). La Conquete du Cameroun. Paris, France: Payot.  
Barclay, G. (1978). A History of the Pacific Islands from the Stone Age to the Present. New York, 
NY: Talplinger Publishing Company. 
Chandler, D. (1966). West Africa: Seizing the German Colonies. History of the First World War. 2nd 
Issue. 
Chandler, D. (1984). West Africa: Seizing the German Colonies. The Marshall Cavendish Illustrated 
Encyclopaedia of World War I (vol. 2). New York, NY: Marshall Cavendish. 
Che-Mfombong, W. (1980). Bamenda under British Administration, 1916-1961. From Native 
Administration to Local Government (Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Yaounde, 
Yaounde, Cameroon.  
Decalo, S. (1976). Historical Dictionary of Togo. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 
Elango, L. Z. (1985). The Anglo-French “Condominium” in Cameroon, 1914-1916: The Myth and 
the Reality. International Journal of African Historical Studies, 18(4), 657-673. 
Essiben, M. (1981). La France et la Redistribution des Territoires du Cameroun. Afrika Zamani, (12 
& 13), 36-52. 
Fage, J. D. (1978). A History of Africa. New York, NY: Alfred Knopf. 
Farwell, B. (1987). The Great War in Africa, 1914-1918. New York, NY: Viking. 
Gorges, E. H. (2004). The Great War in West Africa. Uckfield, England: The Naval & Military Press 
Ltd.  
Henderson, W. O. (1978). Studies in German Colonial History. London, England: Longman. 
Kaspi, A. (1971). French War Aims in Africa, 1914-1919. In P. Gifford & W. R. Louis (Eds.), France 
and Britain in Africa Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Keegan, J. (1988). The First World War. New York, NY: Vintage Books. 
Lovett Z. Elango 125 
 
Moberly, F. J. (1931). A History of the Great War Military Operations Togoland and the Cameroons. 
London, England: H. M. Stationery Office. 
Morell, W. P. (1960). Britain in the Pacific Islands. Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press. 
Njoya, A. N. (n.d.). Le Cameroun dans les Relations Internationales. Yaounde. 
Osuntokun, A. (1975). Anglo-French Occupation and Provisional Partition of Cameroons 1917-
1916. Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 7(4). 
Osuntokun, A. (1979). Nigeria in the First World War. London, England: Longman. 
Osuntokun. J. (1978). Anglo-French Administration of the Mandated Territory of the Cameroons 
1923-1939: A Case Study in Comparative Administration. Quarterly Journal of Administration, 
12(3) pp. 257-270 
Prescott, J. R. V. (1971). The Evolution of Nigeria’s International and Regional Boundaries, 1916-
1971. Vancouver, Canada: Talantus Research Limited. 
Robinson, R., Gallagher, J., & Denny, A. (1961). Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of 
Imperialism in the Dark Continent. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Roger Louis, W. (1967). Great Britain and German Expansionism in Africa, 1884-1914. In P. Gifford 
& W. Roger Louis (Eds.), Britain and Germany in Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Rothwell, V. H. (1971). British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918. Oxford, England: The 
Clarendon Press. 
 
126 Journal of Global Initiatives 
 
Map 1: The Allied Invasion of Cameroon 
 
 
 
Source: David Chandler, “West Africa: Seizing the German Colonies,” History of the First World 
War 2nd Issue, July 1966, p. 363. 
 
  
Lovett Z. Elango 127 
 
 
 
  
128 Journal of Global Initiatives 
 
 
